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The EU started it 
In the early 1990s, the European Economic Community—the predecessor of the European Union 
(EU)—spearheaded an initiative to promote international cooperation in the energy sector, 
particularly with post-Soviet States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Out of this process the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) was born in 1994. Going much beyond international cooperation, the treaty 
allows foreign investors in the energy sector to sue their host States in international arbitral tribunals 
and claim monetary compensation when policy measures and other State action affect their interests. 
Fast-forward to 2021. With 135 known cases initiated to date,1 the ECT’s is the most frequently 
invoked treaty-based investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism.2 As evidenced by a 
growing body of research, the ECT is obsolete considering not only modern tenets of international 
investment law, but also the objectives of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), both global texts 21 years younger.3 The special protections 
under international law that the ECT gives to fossil fuel investors and their investments go in the 
opposite direction of what is needed for the world to decarbonize its energy matrix and fight the 
climate emergency.4 
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The EU should address it 
Mounting pressure by European civil society has brought to light the ECT’s shortcomings and 
inconsistency with EU policies,5 calling on the European Commission to take action by seizing the 
momentum of the ongoing renegotiation—or “modernization”—of the ECT.6 The first three rounds of 
renegotiation talks were held in July, September, and November 2020,7 and the process will continue 
throughout 2021.8 
For good reason, the pressure is on the EU. First, the ECT is not in line with EU investment law and 
policy.9 The Union now negotiates investment agreements that (imperfect as they still are) provide 
substantive rights with reform-oriented language,10 much different from the vaguely worded 
provisions of the ECT. Investment Court Systems (ICS) with standing courts and appellate bodies now 
appear in EU investment agreements in lieu of investor–state arbitration provisions such as the one 
included in the ECT, and the Union intends to create a Multilateral Investment Court to replace ICS.11 
In addition, Belgium requested an opinion from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), which may 
result in a finding of incompatibility of the ECT’s ISDS provisions with EU law.12 Even though the EU’s 
new approaches fail to meaningfully address the core problems of international investment law,13 the 
fact is that the ECT is inconsistent with those new approaches. 
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Second, the ECT is not in line with EU climate law and policy.14 To walk its talk as a climate leader—
with its pledge to carbon neutrality by 2050 reflected in the European Green Deal and the European 
Climate Law—the EU cannot afford to continue to sponsor the ECT, which protects fossil fuel 
investors and investments. In fact, the European Parliament introduced in the European Climate Law 
a mandate for the Union to “end the protection of investments in fossil fuels in the context of the 
modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty.”15 
Third, the EU’s intentions in spearheading the ECT may have been the noblest in 1994, but by 2021 
standards the treaty is an investment and climate aberration. Having started this mess, the EU has 
moral responsibility for cleaning it, for the sake of concerned Europeans as well as the decarbonizing 
world. 
Facing the ongoing ECT renegotiation process, the EU can continue working with others to fix the 
treaty (amendment), reform it through an agreement between EU Member States and other like-
minded states (inter se agreement), leave it (withdrawal), or convince all ECT Members that the best 
solution is to kill it (termination). Below I look into each option. 
Should the EU fix it? 
The Union itself, 26 of its Member States (all but Italy),16 and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM)—an independent organization with the same membership as the EU—together 
represent half of the ECT membership. While this may give the EU some bargaining power in ECT 
renegotiations, amending the ECT requires unanimity,17 and achieving it on investment and climate 
matters will be an uphill battle. 
On investment, public reports about the closed-door renegotiation note that progress has been 
slow.18 After the three rounds of talks held in 2020, a leaked progress report shows that negotiating 
partners are far from reaching unanimity on whether and how the investment protections of the ECT 
should be rewritten,19 even though the European Commission has characterized them as 
“outdated.”20 The existence of widely divergent views on reform of the ECT’s investment provisions21 
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illustrates the challenges of investment treaty negotiations generally, which are tough in a bilateral 
context and understandably even more so in a plurilateral context such as the ECT’s. 
On climate, the EU has proposed language purporting to safeguard States’ right to regulate to combat 
climate change.22 It has also proposed adding to the treaty’s definition of “Energy Materials and 
Products” a timeline to phase out the protection of certain fossil fuel investments under the treaty by 
2030 or 2040,23 based on the EU’s current climate ambitions. These proposals should be more 
ambitious, and would in any event need to be combined with amendments to other provisions. While 
they might then help minimize the threat that the ECT poses to a just low-carbon energy transition, 
the EU’s challenge will be to bring on board its fossil fuel–dependent negotiating partners, which will 
likely not be eager or ready to agree to a phase-out of protections to fossil fuel investments.  
A flexible approach could help accommodate different views from negotiating partners. The flexibility 
embedded in the Paris Agreement—each State’s level of ambition is defined not in an internationally 
negotiated schedule of commitments, but in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)—is behind 
its near-universal acceptance.24 The model Treaty on Sustainable Investment for Climate Change 
Mitigation and Adaptation,25 the drafting of which I led, mirrors this approach. Under the model 
treaty, each State lists the investment sectors and activities that would benefit from treaty protection, 
and those that would be excluded from them. If it insists in renegotiation, the EU could convince 
other ECT Members to adopt such a flexible approach. The EU could commit to a phase-out of 
protections to fossil fuel investments from EU investors abroad and to fossil fuel investments by ECT 
Members in the EU—preferably much more swiftly than its proposed timeline—regardless of whether 
other negotiating partners do the same. 
The fact that this is not a negotiation but a renegotiation gives defenders of the status quo a 
significant advantage over reform advocates: absent unanimity around change, the original text 
remains unchanged—investment provisions continue to be outdated and defective; fossil fuel 
investments continue to be protected. While some degree of give-and-take may still take place in the 
renegotiations, they are unlikely to result in bold reform of the ECT that would align it with EU law 
and policy on investment and climate. Instead, there is a high risk of lowest-common-denominator 
changes and even a stalemate—rounds and rounds of negotiations leading to meaningless change, or 
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If meaningful reform fails, what could the EU still do? 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that, in given 
circumstances, “two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to 
modify the treaty as between themselves alone.”26 Accordingly, if the parties fail to achieve unanimity 
around meaningful reform, EU Member States—perhaps joined by like-minded ECT Members—
should conclude an inter se agreement to modify the ECT as between themselves. For those States 
and investors from those States, the modifying inter se agreement could phase out the treaty’s 
protections to fossil fuel investments, adopt refined investment provisions, and even exclude the 
applicability of certain substantive protections and the ISDS clause. While they are at it, States could 
also agree on a legally binding international law commitment and timeline to swiftly phase out fossil 
fuel subsidies,27 an element that is notably absent from the ECT but that should feature in any treaty 
on energy cooperation between States that claim to be climate champions. 
One of the conditions for concluding an inter se agreement is that the modification it implements 
“does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the 
performance of their obligations.”28 Accordingly, EU Member States would only be allowed to modify 
elements of the ECT without affecting the rights of other ECT Members under the treaty. The 
unreformed ECT would continue to govern the relationship of EU Member States with investors from 
ECT Members that did not sign the inter se agreement. Investors from those other ECT Members 
could still initiate arbitration against EU Member States under the unreformed treaty, and EU 
investors could still launch ECT claims against their non-EU ECT host States. To prevent these 
possibilities, in combination with the inter se agreement, the EU should advance measures aimed at 
barring ECT arbitration, such as a withdrawal of advance consent to ISDS.29 
Another condition is that the inter se agreement “does not relate to a provision, derogation from 
which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole.”30 This provision represents a risk for EU Member States. A non-EU ECT Member sustaining 
the view that, for example, removing protections from fossil fuels under the inter se agreement 
would frustrate the achievement of the object and purpose of the ECT might want to strike down the 
inter se agreement through an inter-State arbitration against EU Member States under ECT Article 
27.31 It is difficult to ascertain the likelihood of such a move or its prospects of success—but it is a 
possibility. 
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Should the EU leave it? 
In late 2020, a group of 280 Members of national Parliaments and of the European Parliament asked 
EU Member States to “explore pathways to jointly withdraw from the ECT.”32 Soon thereafter, the 
French government requested the European Commission to study a “coordinated withdrawal” of the 
EU from the ECT,33 given that it protects fossil fuels and slows down the EU’s 2050 carbon neutrality 
objective. 
From the perspective of the Union, given that the stated reason for withdrawal is the inconsistency of 
the ECT with EU law and policy, any withdrawal should ideally be coordinated, with the entire bloc 
leaving the treaty.  
However, if the Union fails to promote necessary coordination around its own laws and policies, 
unilateral withdrawal by EU Member States is a legitimate way for them to align their foreign 
investment policy with their climate change ambitions and commitments.  
Withdrawal by individual EU Member States can have meaningful political consequences. Within the 
EU, it would continue to mount pressure for other Member States and the Union to reconsider and 
eventually withdraw too. Among remaining ECT Members, it could lead them to reassess the role and 
value of the treaty without the ex-Members, and potentially push remaining ones to meaningful 
reform of the treaty, withdrawal from it, or even its termination. Globally, it would likely weaken the 
attractiveness and certainly the political pressure of staying in the ECT or joining it. 
Think, for example, of Nigeria. In the context of efforts by the ECT Secretariat to silently expand the 
ECT toward Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, persuading developing countries to join 
the outdated treaty, Nigeria started the process of accession to the ECT.34 With the largest oil and gas 
reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is struggling to move away from its petroleum addiction.35 
Nigerian political and economic elites in power have perhaps not yet realized that Africa’s future is 
not in oil, but in renewables,36 and may be considering accession under the illusion that ECT 
membership would help the country to attract foreign investment—including from EU investors—in 
its petroleum sector. It would not.37 Worse, upon Nigeria’s eventual accession to the ECT, foreign 
investors from ECT Members in Nigeria’s petroleum industry would benefit from old-generation 
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treaty protections tending to make the country’s low-carbon transition difficult and expensive as a 
result of ISDS threats and cases. With big EU players withdrawing, ECT accession would become less 
attractive and more difficult for the Nigerian government to justify. 
Withdrawal is permitted under ECT Article 47 and takes effect one year after the date of receipt of 
the withdrawal notification by the depositary of the treaty.38 Energy investments made by EU 
investors in other ECT Members or by investors from ECT Members in the EU would no longer be 
protected by the ECT once the withdrawal takes effect. New investors would not have access to the 
ECT’s ISDS mechanism to protect their post-withdrawal investments, significantly reducing the risk of 
ISDS cases against EU Member States.  
However, under ECT Article 47(3)—the so-called sunset or survival clause—for 20 years from the 
effective date of EU Member States’ withdrawal from the ECT, the treaty would continue to apply to 
existing EU investments in other ECT Members, and to existing investments made by other ECT 
Members’ investors in the EU.39  
The absurdity of the sunset clause cannot be stressed enough: for the two decades, a time that is 
crucial for the global energy transition and nearly overlaps with the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality 
timeline, ECT Members would still be able to challenge and seek compensation for climate policies of 
the EU and its Member States, and existing EU investments abroad would still be able to challenge 
policies of non-EU ECT Members. In addition, if outstanding ECT Members reform the treaty after the 
EU’s withdrawal, for better or worse, any amendments would not apply to EU Member States, since 
they would never have signed or ratified such amendments; withdrawal would therefore mean the 
survival, for the EU, of the unreformed treaty. 
While withdrawing, EU Member States could attempt to negotiate out of the sunset clause but would 
be subjected to it unless all other ECT Members agree to relieve them from the application of the 
clause.  
But the situation would be different between withdrawing EU Member States. In jointly withdrawing, 
they could conclude an inter se agreement under VCLT Art. 41 to neutralize the effect of the ECT’s 
survival clause as between themselves.40 The agreement would prohibit the initiation of ECT-based 
ISDS disputes initiated by an investor from an EU Member State against another EU Member State. 
Considering that these intra-EU disputes account for 80 of the 135 ECT-based cases initiated to date, 
the possibility of an EU withdrawal combined with an inter se agreement neutralizing the survival 
clause could substantially reduce the risks posed by ECT-based arbitration to climate action. If joined 
by non-EU withdrawing States, the agreement would have an even greater positive impact. 
Should the EU kill it? 
Given the ECT’s risks for and negative impacts on climate policy and public budgets, its unfitness for 
the purpose of attracting sustainable, climate-friendly foreign investment,41 and its negative 
perception by civil society, the EU should work to bring its partners on board with the idea of 
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termination.42 The EU’s current efforts to renegotiate the treaty—with low likelihood of a successful 
outcome—would be more valuable if employed to terminate it.  
If, for example, Japan’s addiction to coal is what is fueling its opposition to climate-friendly reform of 
the ECT,43 the EU could give its trade and investment negotiators a break and bring in energy policy 
experts to make the case against fossil fuel addiction. It makes not only environmental and climate 
sense to transition out of coal, oil, and gas, and to stop protecting them under international 
investment law, but also economic sense. The EU knows it,44 and it would be in everyone’s interest for 
the EU to share it with ECT partners. 
Absent a termination provision in the ECT, terminating it requires “consent of all the parties after 
consultation with the other contracting States.”45 Since ultimately termination, like amendment, is not 
within the control of the EU, the Union’s next-best strategy would be to withdraw from the ECT and 
neutralize the survival clause through an inter se agreement, which non-EU withdrawing States 
should be welcome to join. 
That said, the great advantage of termination would be for negotiating partners to start from a clean 
slate, asking first the fundamental question: how can international law help our countries to phase 
out fossil fuel investments, ramp up low-carbon energy investment, and promote a just transition, in 
line with the Paris Agreement and SDG 7.1 target to “ensure universal access to affordable, reliable, 
and modern energy services” by 2030?46 The substantive provisions of the model Treaty on 
Sustainable Investment for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation,47 the idea of a Framework 
Convention on Investment and Sustainable Development,48 and other academic insights here49 and 
there50 offer some answers. (Spoiler alert: old-generation investment protections, and mechanisms to 
settle disputes between foreign investors and host States, whether by international arbitration or 
adjudication, are not the answer.) 
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